Five security checks to run before your accelerator application
Accelerator applications close in November, and Breakpoint lands in London straight after. If your Solana project holds users’ funds, the question you’ll be asked in some form is: how do you know it’s safe?
Most exploits don’t come from clever new attacks. They come from a handful of mistakes that turn up again and again. Here are five worth checking before you hit submit.
1. Every instruction that moves funds checks who signed it
The most common way funds go missing is an instruction that never checks the right person signed. If a withdraw instruction takes an authority account but never requires its signature, anyone can pass in your authority’s address and drain the vault.
In Anchor, use Signer for the authority and tie it to the account it controls:
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct Withdraw<'info> {
#[account(mut, has_one = authority)]
pub vault: Account<'info, Vault>,
pub authority: Signer<'info>,
}In native programs, check is_signer yourself on every account that should have signed.
2. Every account is owned by who you think it is
Your program trusts the data in the accounts passed to it. If it never checks who owns an account, an attacker can create a look-alike account under their own program, filled with whatever data they like.
Anchor’s Account type checks the owner for you. The risk comes back the moment you reach forUncheckedAccount or a raw AccountInfo. In native programs, check it explicitly:
if vault_info.owner != program_id {
return Err(ProgramError::IncorrectProgramId);
}3. Your PDA seeds can’t collide
Program derived addresses are only as unique as their seeds. If two users can derive the same address, one can overwrite or spend the other’s state. Include the user’s key in seeds for anything per-user, and use the canonical bump rather than accepting a bump from the caller.
4. Your maths can’t overflow
Token amounts are large integers, and release builds don’t always stop overflow. A balance that wraps around to a huge number is a free withdrawal. Make sure overflow-checks = true is set in your release profile, and use checked maths such as checked_add and checked_mul wherever amounts are calculated.
5. The off-chain code is as tight as the program
Audits often stop at the program, but attackers don’t. Your backend, bot or signing service moves money too. Check that:
- Private keys aren’t in your repo, including
.envfiles - Hot wallets hold only what they need to
- The server never trusts an amount or a recipient sent by the client
- Deposits are credited only after the transaction is confirmed on-chain
How to check all five in minutes
This is the checklist Probus runs, across Anchor programs, native programs and the off-chain code around them. You get a score, findings with file and line, and a fix brief to paste into your AI coding tool.
An automated review isn’t a human audit, and before you hold serious value you’ll want both. But it catches the common mistakes early and cheaply, while they’re still easy to fix.
Build for Breakpoint founders: your full report and monitoring until 31 December are free, with codes that expire on 30 November. See the offer and claim it here.
Everyone else can run a free scan anytime.